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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Whether a long-term lessee, who has unqualifiedly agreed to "maintain and 
keep in repair (and . . . put into repair where necessary)" the roof of the leased premises, 
is obligated to meet that obligation, even if replacement of the roof is required in order 
to maintain the roof, or to keep or put the roof in sound condition? 
2. Whether a lessor is under a duty to repair or replace any portion of the 
leased premises when the common law imposes no such duty and the controlling lease 
agreement does not refer to any such obligation on the part of the lessor? 
A trial court's determination as to whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous 
is a question of law. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A trial 
court's interpretation of an unambiguous, integrated contract is a question of law. 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Group, 868 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A trial court's determination as 
to whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is also a question of law. Higgins v. 
1
 Defendants/Appellants have included issues in their Brief that were not set forth in 
their Docketing Statement, and, in violation of Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, they have failed to cite to the record showing that their stated issues were 
preserved in the trial court. 
1 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). These questions of law are reviewed 
on appeal for correctness, without deference to the trial court's determinations. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Although the trial court's determinations as to 
questions of law are accorded no deference, an appellate court "may affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied 
on below." Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
determinative of, or of central importance to, this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
in the Court Below 
Plaintiff/Appellant SLW/Utah, L.C. ("SLW") is in agreement with the description 
by the Griffithses of the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its 
disposition in the trial court, as set forth under the heading "Statement of the Case" in 
the Griffithses' Brief. Appellants' Brief, at 2-3. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Griffithses purchased a building on Orange Street in Salt Lake City, 
Utah ("Orange Street Building") on January 2, 1985. Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths, 
dated February 10, 1997 ("Jerry Griffiths (Second) Aff."), at 3, 1 9 (R. at 128). 
2. The Griffithses sold the Orange Street Building to Scott Schirmer 
("Schirmer") and other investors on May 12, 1986. Purchase Agreement, Exhibit "A" 
to Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 1 (R. 
at 148); Jerry Griffiths (Second) Aff., at 3, 1 9 (R. at 128). 
3. The Purchase Agreement provides as follows: 
It is a condition of this Agreement that at the time of closing the 
Buyer, as landlord, and the Seller [Griffithses], as Tenant, will enter into 
a lease of the Property . . . . Such lease shall provide that Seller shall be 
entitled to receive any rent from any current existing leases and Seller shall 
pay to Buyer a fixed guaranteed lease as provided in said Lease Agreement. 
Purchase Agreement, at 16 (R. at 163). 
4. On the same date the Purchase Agreement was executed, SLW Properties2 
and the Griffithses entered into a Lease Agreement (Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Jerry W. 
Griffiths, dated October 24, 1996) ("Jerry Griffiths (First) Aff.") (R. at 48-56), pursuant 
2The Appellee, SLW/Utah, L.C., is the entity created by the purchasers of the 
Orange Street property to hold the real estate. Affidavit of Scott Schirmer ("Schirmer 
Aff."), at 2 , 13 (R. at 91). 
3 
to which the Orange Street premises were leased to the Griffithses for fifteen years. Id., 
at 1, 1 1.2 (R. at 48). 
5. At the time of the purchase/sale and lease-back transaction, the roof on the 
Orange Street Building was the original roof and was, at that time, approximately thirteen 
years old. Jerry Griffiths (First) Aff., at 2, \ 5 (R. at 45); Affidavit of Carl R. Clark 
("Clark Aff."), at 2-3, 1 8 (R. at 58-59). 
6. The original roof on the Orange Street Building had a maximum life 
expectancy of twenty years. Clark Aff., at 2, \ 7 (R. at 158). Therefore, at the time the 
Lease Agreement was entered into, the maximum remaimng life expectancy of the roof 
was seven years. 
7. During the winter and spring of 1996, the roof of the Orange Street Building 
was leaking. Jerry Griffiths (First) Aff., at 2, 1 7 (R. at 145).3 
8. As of February 1996, the roof was in such poor condition that piecemeal 
repairs would not be sufficient to bring it into sound condition; the roof required total 
3
 SLW maintains the problems began developing with the roof in 1994 or 1995, 
Schirmer Aff., at 4, 1 13 (R. at 93), and that on January 25, 1995, SLW caused a letter 
to be sent to the Griffithses requesting that they replace the roof, or a major portion of 
it, pursuant to their obligation under the Lease Agreement. Schirmer Aff. at 4, \ 14 (R. 
at 94). Nevertheless, for purposes of this appeal, the sworn statements of Jerry Griffiths 
concerning when the roof problems were first noticed — even if demonstrably false — 
must be accepted as true. See, e.g., Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 
752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
4 
restoration or replacement in order ior *: LO I,^ ^ i r; or put into repair. Jerry 
Griffiths (Fi-n • * •- * * - R. at 58).4 
9. The Griffithses hired Clark's Roofing Co., Inc., to install a roof on the 
Orange Street guying, which work was performed between February and April 1996. 
Clark \ ff at 2 3. 11! 5. 5 (]|[ [ it 58-59); Jerry Griffiths (First) A ff., t 3. If 1 1 (R .1 
46). 
111 .e unmixes paid for the work done by Clark's Roofing Company, Inc., 
* " ^ \ 
The Lease Agreement unqualifiedly requires the Griffithses to maintain the 
roof, to keep it in repair, and, where necessary, to put it In repair, ii.e unambiguous, 
ijiitjtulliiial |irn\Mnii in 'iiiili! In I n| illii I i I .i \«reern - "* K 4" *" : 
In addition to the above, Tenant shall maintain and keep in repair (and shall put 
into repair where necessary) the walls and roof of the building . 
Lease Agreement, at . 
I he I ease / -cement also ronrirr; *Vr . ui the lease term, me 
tenant shall surrender the premises "in as good condition as It was at the beginning of the 
term, reasonable wear excepted." Lease Agreement, ^ i. 
4
 SLW agrees that repair of the entire roof was necessary as of 1996, and even 
earlier. However, as the absence of any citation to the record by the Griffithses would 
indicate, there is no support for the assertion in the Griffithses' Brief that "the roof over 
the west portion of the premises failed completely." Appellants' Brief, at 5 r r 
5 
13. The Lease Agreement does not provide that the lessor has any duty to 
repair, ma^tain, keep in repair, or put into repair, the roof of the Orange Street Building 
(R. at 48-56). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court Did Not Resort to Parol Evidence in Making its 
Determination, 
Contrary to the unfounded assertion of the Griffithses, the trial court did not utilize 
parol evidence in reaching its determination that, under the terms of the Lease 
Agreement, the Griffithses are obligated to take whatever measures are required, 
including the renovation or replacement of the entire roof, to keep or put the roof in 
repair. The trial court mad * it abundantly clear that parol c idence was unnecessary to 
resolve the issues before it because of its determinations that "the lease was an integrated 
contract" and "the critical language" contained in Article 4 of the Lease Agreement "was 
unambiguous." Order, at 1 (R. at 194). 
2. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That the Griffithses are Obliged 
Under the Terms of the Lease Agreement to Put the Roof Into Repair. 
Even if the Required Work Goes Beyond Piecemeal Repairs, 
Article 4 of the Lease Agreement requires the Griffithses to maintain the roof, to 
"keep" the roof "in repair" and to "put" the roof "into repair" where necessary. The 
plain language of the Lease Agreement obligates the Griffithses to keep and, where 
necessary, put the roof into a state of good, sound, useful condition, without any 
6 
restriction or qualification as to what might be required to keep or put the roof in such 
condition. 
Bpcausf rrnnvfirioT it the entire runf, rather than simply piecemeal repairs, was 
required in order to put the roof in repair, the Griffithses were required to have that work 
done. Nowhere in the Lease Agreement does it say thw irrithses can a\ old thei i: duty 
* *v --\ - oiecemeal repairs, is 
required in order to get the job done. 
The Griffithses had a duty to maintain the icoi, is- *;eep tne rocA In repair, and, 
ilinv necessary, in pul Mir noof iiiln inuiir Tin +" "• i~a:r Replacement 
of .the roof was required in order to maintain the rui;f, J :o ^eep or put the roof into 
repair. Therefore, the Griffithses had a duty to replace the roof. 
3. Neither the Common Law Nor the Terms of the Lease Agreement 
Impose Any Duty Whatsoever on SLW to Repair or Replace the Roof. 
Consistent with the parties' agreement that the Griffithses would pay to SLW "a 
fixed guaranteed lease," Purchase Agreement, ,, .- -.;.-. ,= 
Ajzreomr - requirement that SLW repair or replace anything in, on, or 
around the Orange Street Building. Where, as here, there is no contractual obligation on 
the part of a lessor to repair or replace a roof, the common l.r.v w ill jmi impose sin h ,i 
dut) , Oven if lli ,: Griffithses had not committed unqualifiedly, as they did, to maintain 
the roof and to keep and put the roof in sound condition (i.e., "in repair"), there would 
7 
be no duty to repair or replace on the part of SLW. Where lease agreements are silent 
as to any duty by anyone to repair or replace, and where there is no new governmental 
requirement, outside the contemplation of the parties, compelling a repair or replacement, 
the courts have found that no one has a duty to repair or replace. 
Here, however, that is not the situation, because (1) the Griffithses certainly 
contemplated that the 20-year roof, which was thirteen years old at the time their lease 
commenced, would require replacement during the 15-year lease term; and (2) the 
Griffithses explicitly agreed to maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, and put the roof 
in repair, where necessary. Replacement of the roof being necessary in order to maintain 
the roof, and to keep or put the roof in repair, the obligation for its replacement was 
solely that of the Griffithses. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONSIDER PAROL EVIDENCE IN 
MAKING ITS DETERMINATION: IN FACT. IT EXPRESSLY RULED 
THAT THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT AND 
THAT ARTICLE 4 OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS UNAMBIGUOUS. 
Without any basis whatsoever, the Griffithses have argued at length that the trial 
court "impermissibly considered parol evidence offered by SLW," Appellants' Brief, at 
10, and that "[t]he admission of the extrinsic evidence necessarily changed the 
interpretation of the lease." Id. 
8 
The parol evidence about which the Griffithses complain concerned whether the 
court of anything remotely relating to parol evidence was the court's reference during the 
hearing on the motions for summary judgment to the arguments of the parties. The 
The plaintiff contends that it is not liable because this is a net lease 
and that, as such, the landlord will only receive a fixed rent without any 
other charges. 
Partial I raiiscri.pt c tf Heai ing, Api il 18, 199 ; "' {' ""! ; ai tial • I ' " ) , a t 2 [R it 215) 
The trial court did not indicate in any way that it was considering any parol 
evidence with respect to the "net lease" issue, or with respect to anything else In fact. 
by her comments immediately following the reference ^ .^, .JI^J I S ^ C .u^e 
Stirba made it clear that reference to extrinsic evidence was unnecessary and that she was 
limiting her analysis to the four corners of the Lease Agreement. Judge Stirba stated: 
The outcome of these motions depends on whether the phrase ' 'tenant shall 
maintain and keep in repair and shall put into repair, where necessary, a 
wall and roof of the building of which the premises are a part," and so on. 
Whether that is clear and not ambiguous, each party says that : " 
clear and unambiguous as each party respectively interprets that particular 
phrase. Looking at this contract, it appears to me that it's an integrated 
contract . . . . 
9 
I agree with both parties that there are no material facts in dispute 
and find as a matter of law tint the phrase is clear and unambiguous. 
Partial Tr., at 2 (R. at 215).5 
Likewise, in it vvritten order, the trial court made clear that it did not consider any 
parol evidence in arriving at its decision but, rather, found the Lease Agreement to be 
an integrated contract with unambiguous provisions relating to the Griffithses' duty to 
maintain the roof, and to keep and put it into repair. Order, at 1 (R. at 215). 
II. THE GRIFFITHSES' UNQUALIFIED COVENANT TO "MAINTAIN AND 
KEEP IN REPAIR (AND . . . PUT INTO REPAIR WHERE NECESSARY) 
THE . . . ROOF OF THE BUILDING" OBLIGATES THEM TO MEET 
THAT DUTY, EVEN IF REPLACEMENT OF THE ROOF IS REQUIRED 
TO MAINTAIN THE ROOF, OR TO KEEP OR PUT THE ROOF IN 
REPAIR. 
The Griffithses argue at great length that the verb, "to repair," does not mean 
"replace,"6 "rebuild," or "reconstruct." Appellants' Brief, at 16-26. However, they 
5
 The quotation here is taken directly from the prepared transcript of the hearing on 
the parties' motions for summary judgment. It seems, however, that with some minor 
punctuation changes, and word corrections, the statement and meaning of the trial court 
in the first two sentences quoted above would be more accurately and coherently 
portrayed as follows: 
The outcome of these motions depends on whether the phrase "tenant shall 
maintain and keep in repair (and shall put into repair where necessary) the 
walls and roof of the building of which the premises are a part," and so on 
— whether that is clear and not ambiguous. Each party says that it's clear 
and unambiguous as each party respectively interprets that particular phrase. 
6Even if the word "repair" were used in the Lease Agreement in the same sense as 
(continued...) 
10 
have entirely missed the mark, inasmuch as the Lease Agreement entered into between 
i;*;; ^riinthses and SL W does not provide that the Griffithses ' -p~.r. ' ^i~ i;iey 
wil 1 " ~i^'nt:> " * * J where necessary, "put into repair" the roof. 
Applying the plain, common meaning of the terminology actually used in the Lease 
Agreement, the conclusion is inescapable that the Griffithses assumed the duty , without 
in good, sound, usable condition. 
A The plain. Ordinary Meanings of the Words and Phrases Used in 
Paragraph 4.1 of the Lease Agreement Make it Clear That the 
Griffithses are Required to Maintain the Roof, and to Keep and Put the 
Roof in Sound Condition, Even if Replacement of the Roof is Required, 
In their Brief, the Griffithses state as follows: 
W hen interpreting contracts, " 'the ordinary and usual meaning 01 aie 
words used is given effect." Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan, 
899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah App. 1995), citing Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 
1271 (Utah 1988). The "ordinary and usual" meaning is often best derived 
from standard, non-legal dictionaries. Id., citing Government Employees 
Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1982). 
Appellant .s" Bi ie I:' ;i tl I  ; II 8 
...continued) 
that addressed by the Griffithses in their Brief, it would commonly include "replacement." 
See, e.g., Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremcot Inc., 753 F.2d 242, 244 (2d Cir. 1985) 
("Defective roofs are generally repaired by removing and replacing the entire roof." 
(emphasis added)); Altaian, New Face Off Over School Bond, Post and Courier 
(Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 15, 1998, at Al ("I remember complaining when they were 
doing these magnet schools that there were 34 roofs that needed repair, from 
replacements to minor repair." (emphasis added)). 
11 
With those statements SLW wholeheartedly agrees. By the application of those 
rules of contract interpretation, the duty to replace the roof falls squarely on the 
Griffithses. 
1. By Agreeing to "Maintain" the Roof, tib Griffithses Obligated Themselves to 
Replace It if Replacement Were Necessary to Keep or Put the Roof in Sound 
Condition, 
The Griffithses' promise to "maintain" the roof is enough, by itself to impose 
upon them a duty to replace the roof if replacement is required to keep the roof in good, 
sound condition. As commonly used, the word "maintain" is defined as follows: 
to keep in a certain condition or position, especially of efficiency, good 
repair, etc.; to preserve; as the state maintains the roads. 
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1087 (2d ed. 1983); see also 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (4th rev. ed.) ("[I]t is variously defined as acts of repair 
and other acts to prevent a decline, lapse or cessation from existing state or condition; 
. . . keep in good order; keep in proper condition; keep in repair; keep up; . . . rebuild; 
repair; replace . . . . " ) . 
The state could not truly be said to "maintain" the roads when, after a road is 
washed out by a flood, the state refused to rebuild or replace it.7 Neither can the 
Griffithses credibly assert that, while the roof is leaking, they would be "maintaining" it 
7The duty to "maintain" a highway was recently held by a British appellate court to 
include a duty to construct a proper drainage system. Duty to maintain highway not 
absolute, The Times (London), July 10, 1997, at 42. 
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by refusing to replace the roof if replacement were required in order to put it in good 
condition. 
... , .jdman v. Lei V bir, 241 P 2d 1 1 9 0 u: iz 1952), the lease agreement at issue 
provided that the lessees i * 'ere to "maintain and keep in good repair (not including major 
structural alterations) the entire premises." 241 P.2d at 781. Noting that "[t]he lessees 
were not only to 'repair' the premises but they were, in addition thereto, required to 
<rpci'",,air * * j" *->" * x1 ''"^. \ irr ^"^jr -**-•.'* ^^ts.iri 
to "maintain" the premises, had a duty to replace a gas line pipe with a larger, different 
type of pipe in order to bring it into conformity with a municipal ordinance. 11 
and had to be replaced," the Florida District Court of Appeal held that the lessee, who 
had agreed to "maintain the interior and exterior" of the leased premises was responsible 
1 u i 111 c l e p 1 a L c J 11 e 11L n I 1111 11 > 111. S t >a i /1t11, \ i I. . * /. ^  ginbotham C 'h eI v o let 
Oldsmobile, Inc., 445 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. Dist. ^ . ^ F F . xJS4).8 
The decision of the court in Southeast Banks Trust Co. comports with the common 
m e a n i n g J . ...;, -•- - • - * . ; . . .- . ^ - ^ l ; - . ^ a W l i a i i i t a " 
8In Southeast Banks Trust Co., the lessor had agreed to "keep structural elements of 
the building in good and substantial repair." 445 So. 2d at 348. The court found that 
a "structural element" is a "part of a building which supports it," - -•* ' w 'he roo r •• ;r 
excluded from, that definition. Id. at 349. 
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a roof by allowing it to leak and cave in, while offerir i the excuse that the roof could not 
be put in good condition other than by replacement. 
By finally having work done on the roof to stop the leaking, the Griffithses simply 
fulfilled their duty to "maintain" the roof, which they were obligated to do by the express 
terms of the Lease Agreement. 
2, Bv Agreeing to Keep the Roof in Repair, and. Where Necessary, to Put the 
Roof Into Repair, the Griffithses Obligated Themselves to Replace the Roof 
if Replacement Were Necessary to Keep or Put the Roof in Sound Condition. 
A fatal error made by the Griffithses is found in that portion of their Brief 
immediately following their statements regarding contract interpretation. There, dealing 
with the word "repair" in a completely different sense than used in the Lease Agreement, 
the Griffithses state as follows: 
Because the "ordinary and usual" meaning of "repair" does not mean to 
"replace," "reconstruct," or "rebuild," the trial court's interpretation to the 
contrary should be reversed. 
Appellants' Brief, at 18. 
The Griffithses' argument concerning the word "repair" is, irrelevantly, in the 
context of the word used as the verb "to repair," or as the noun, "a repair." The 
Griffithse. ignore the actual language of the Lease Agreement, which is dispositive of the 
issue here. The parties agreed not that the Griffithses would "repair the roof," nor that 
they would make "a repair" to the roof; rather, they agreed, unambiguously, that the 
14 
Griffith ses w< *] ' . w ^ •. 
repair." 
That usage of the phrase "in repair" commits the Griffithses to do whatever is 
icquned I i ' i i | pul illin i I nil «jnud, 'niiiid, usable tciidiiinii, without any 
qualification. "In repair" refers to a state or a condition; it does not in any manner 
restrict the means utilized to "keep" or "put" something in that state or condition. 
' I lie dictionaries . define the \ repair" :; -he context of the phrase *^  
repair" all compel a determination that the Griffithses' r-^nmifrip' 
the roof "in repair" gives rise to a duty to take whatever steps are required to "keep" or 
>.., v.,.. ^ in a good, sound, usable condition, ilk, knowing are illustrative of the 
ordinrr* -r ^ i definition s of "i epai i*" I ease Agreement: 
condition with respect to soundness and usability: a house in good (or bad) 
repair. 
W E B S T E R ' S D i m II>.I i AivihRiLAN h N o i h i i hJo i I i a! p w / i . 
The state of being repaired, or in good or sound condition; as, the house is 
in repair or out of repair; also, condition with respect to soundness or need 
of repairing; as, in good, bad, or excellent repair. 
WhBSl'LF'1' Nl/W iNIIRM^lluNAL IJRIIUNAI' •' Hi t LNULlSll LANUUAGL 1\ I 
a condition or state • in good repair. 
CUAMlihKS 2 l M CLNIlW'i Ull IIUNAia I 18J (I ' .U'd I '^fil 
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in (a) good/bad (state of) repair in good/bad condition 
LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH 881 (2d ed. 1987). 
in repair, in good or proper condition (esp. of structures; so into repair), 
out of repair, in bad condition, requiring repairs. 
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 627 (2d ed. 1989). 
The use of the phrase "in repair" to describe a state or condition — rather than the 
means used (e.g., repair, replacement, reconstruction) to obtain that state or condition — 
is common; in fact, it is the only accepted use of the phrase. For instance, in 
GULLIVER'S TRAVELS, Jonathan Swift described the homes in Lagado as follows: 
The next morning after my arrival he took me in his chariot to see 
the town, which is about half the bigness of London, but the houses very 
strangely built, and most of them out of repair. 
Jonathan Swift, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 142 (Lewis A. Landa ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 
1960) (emphasis added); see also MARK TWAIN'S NOTEBOOK 345 (2d ed. 1935) ("It is 
not best that we use our morals week days; it gets them out of repairs for Sundays." 
(emphasis added)). 
Likewise, the common usage by the courts of the phrase "in repair" refers to a 
state or condition — even where replacement of a roof is required in order to "put it in 
repair." 
The water was over four feet deep in it, and debris from the Yuba was 
deposited in it to a considerable depth. The underpinning of the center of 
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the building was washed out, and the roof fell in. It cost between $2,000 
and $3,000 to put it in repair again 
Wood? ujj i i * 'orth Bioomfield Gravel 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1931) (holding that duty to "put in repair" entailed "replacing" steel 
deck). 
J g n o j i u g tin i H ' d i i i a i y l i n a g e \\\ i ln | i l n m i ill i r j ' i i i i r , i u i ill in illm I  n i 
Agreement, the Griffithses rely on cases involving an entirely different usage of the word 
"repair," or on cases involving "general covenants" or situations in which the repair or 
their lease agreement. 
For instance, the Griffithses seek to find support in Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST 
Realty, , .. - . , \\: p. . - ._s" Bi ief, at 13 21 , I hat 
case is wholly inapposite for several reasons. First, and perhaps most importantly, the 
lease under consideration in Mobil Oil, unlike the Lease Agreement entered into between 
.,,. Urriffithses ana ., . provides that "lessee agrees to . up:,:: 
premises "' * ' 'emphasis added). That commitment was far different from 
that of the Griffithses; the lessee i 'Aobil Oil agreed to make "all repairs," not to "keep 
in r°*- • „ . .to r*rs]: he re*^, ^ause at Issue »n :>io;;u . was a 
vtwv Mfi' i in ni linn inn iidiiui null irrike specific I'rfnnit i In ihr ,irea nl lln1 premises r * * < 11 I i f I r n* 
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structural repairs. Further, the amount required to complete the structural repairs in 
Mobil Oil was far more than the yearly rental amount; here, the cost of repairing the roof 
was less than half the annual rental amount.9 Finally, the court in Mobil Oil found that 
the repairs were so unforeseen and so substantial that it would be unreasonable to require 
the tenant to make them. Id. at 661. In the instant case, of course, the need for a new 
roof during the term of the lease was not only foreseeable — it was a virtual certainty, 
and the Griffithses knew it. 
Next, the Griffithses rely on Sandelman v. Buckeye Realty, Inc., 576 N.E.2d 1038 
(111. App. Ct. 1991). Appellants' Brief, at 18, 22-23. That case, however, is also 
inapposite to the issues presented by this appeal. First of all, although the lease at issue 
in Sandelman provided that the tenant was to "keep said premises . . . in good repair/ 
id. at 1039 (emphasis added), the court resorted to dictionary definitions of the word 
"repair" as if the word were used in an entirely different manner than actually used in the 
lease agreement. Id. at 1040. Also, of critical importance, the court in Sandelman 
"note[d] the absence of any express language pertaining to the roof." Id. In fact, the 
9In Washington Univ. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 801 S.W.2d 458, 
465-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that "the usual and ordinary meaning of 
repair does not exclude a repair that is structural in nature," and distinguished Mobil Oil 
on the bases that (1) Mobil Oil did not involve a long-term lease, (2) the lease in Mobil 
Oil "provided for certain repairs to be made by the landlord," id. at 466, and (3) "[t]he 
structural repair at issue was to correct an unforeseeable latent structural defect which 
existed prior to the lease." Id. 
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decision in Sandelman hinged on the principle — inapplicable where, as here, a covenant 
deals specifically with a roof — that a lessee's "general covenant," relating to the 
premises as a whole, does not require the lessee to make repairs involving "structural 
changes,"10 or to make "renewals and replacements which would last a lifetime." Id. 
Sandelman can have no application to the instant matter, where the subject Lease 
Agreement does not contain a general covenant, but, rather, a specific requirement that 
the lessee "maintain" the roof, keep the roof "in repair," and, where necessary, put the 
roof "into repair." 
For the same and for additional reasons, Scott v. Prazma, 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo. 
1976), is of no help to the Griffithses. As in Sandelman, the lease at issue in Scott 
required the lessee to keep the leased premises "in good repair," yet the court relied on 
the definition for the word "repair" as a verb (i.e., to repair). Id. at 577. Of perhaps 
even greater importance, the extensive repairs at issue in Scott were required by the 
municipality in which the leased premises were located, to bring them into compliance 
with the building code and safety regulations. Id. at 572-75. Those requirements were 
20Contrary to the decision in Sandelman, the court in Washington Univ. held that a 
lessee who has undertaken to "make all repairs necessary to keep the leased premises in 
good repair" has a duty to make all necessary "structural repairs." 801 S.W.2d at 465. 
According to the court, "the usual and ordinary meaning of repair does not exclude a 
repair that is structural in nature." Id. at 465. In Washington Univ., the court also 
required the lessee to replace the roofs on four buildings. Id. at 467. 
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found by the court to have been outside the contemplation of the parties at the time they 
entered into their lease agreement; in fact, the court said that to require, under a general 
covenant, the repairs at issue would be "shockingly unforeseen." Id. at 577. Just the 
opposite is true with regard to the Orange Street building roof, which had seven years of 
expected remaining life at the beginning of the Griffithses' 15-year lease. 
The Griffithses also find no support in Expert Corp. v. La Salle Nat'I Bank, 496 
N.E.2d 3 (111. App. Ct. 1986). Expert also involved a general repair clause, without any 
reference in the lease agreement to the specific area of the premises requiring repair or 
replacement. Id. at 4. Also, the decision in Expert would have been just the opposite 
had the court found the alterations or additions were not "unforeseen future events not 
within the contemplation of the parties at the time the lease was executed." Id. at 5. 
The Griffithses cite to Quebe v. Davis, 586 N.E.2d 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), 
Appellants' Brief, at 18, 21-22; however, a close reading of that case causes one to 
wonder why. In Quebe, the lessor was required to replace the roof of the leased 
premises because of his commitment in the lease agreement to "repair and restore" the 
premises if they are damaged by "fire or other cause." Id. at 918. 
Finally, the Griffithses cite to Realty & Rebuilding Co. v. REA, 194 P. 1024 (Cal. 
1920). Appellants' Brief, at 18, 23. However, Realty & Rebuilding stands for nothing 
more than the proposition, irrelevant here, that a general covenant by a lessee to repair 
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premises does not create a duty to rebuild the premises after they are destroyed by 
fire.11 
Although the Griffithses have cited to the above-described inapposite cases from 
several other jurisdictions, one need look no further than to the controlling precedent, 
Wolfe v. White, 225 P.2d 729 (Utah 1950), which is nowhere mentioned in the 
Griffithses' Brief. 
11
 As the court in Realty & Rebuilding recognized, the decisions are not at all uniform 
regarding whether a general covenant to repair imposes an obligation to rebuild structures 
that have been completely destroyed. Realty & Rebuilding, 194 P. at 1028. In fact, 
many cases have affirmed the long-standing common law rule that a general repair clause 
does indeed create a duty to rebuild a structure that has been completely destroyed by fire 
or other cause. See, e.g., Pivnick v. Seaboard Supply Co., 105 A.2d 695, 698 (N.J. 
Super. 1954) (At common law "the tenant's covenant to make repairs, or to return the 
premises in the same condition as upon the demise, obliged him to repair fire damage, 
and to rebuild in case of total destruction."); Arnold-Evans Co. v. Hardung, 232 P. 290, 
291 (Wash. 1925) ("[I]f the tenant enters into an express and unconditional covenant to 
repair and keep in repair, or to surrender the premises in good repair, he is liable for the 
destruction of buildings not rebuilt by him, though the destruction may have occurred by 
fire or other accident, or by the act of enemies, without fault on his part."); Armstrong 
v. Maybee, 48 P. 737, 738 (Wash. 1897) ("'[A] covenant "to repair, uphold, and 
support," or to "well and sufficiently repair," or to keep in repair and leave as found, or 
to "repair and keep in repair," to keep in "good repair, natural wear and tear excepted," 
to make "all necessary repairs," to deliver up "in tenantable repair," or to "deliver up the 
premises in as good a condition as they now are," all impose upon the covenantor the 
duty of rebuilding or restoring premises destroyed or injured by the elements.'" (quoting 
Wood, Landlord & Tenant § 370 (2d ed.))); Jones v. Two Rivers Ford, Inc., 301 S.E.2d 
192, 195 (W. Va. 1983) ("'At common law where a covenant to repair was contained in 
the lease and the building was destroyed by some fire or casualty, the lessee was 
responsible for repairs thereto, whether he was at fault or not.'"). 
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In Wolfe, the same question was posed as now faces this Court: If a party to a 
lease agreement commits to "keep the roof of the leased premises in good condition and 
repair," who is liable for the replacement of the roof if replacement is necessary to keep 
the roof in good condition and repair? The Utah Supreme Court posed the issue very 
simply: "It [the roof] was out of good condition and repair. Who was to put it in?" 225 
P.2d at 731. Of course, the answer was that the party who committed in a lease 
agreement to keep the roof in repair was obligated to put the roof in good condition and 
repair — even if replacement of the roof was required in order to achieve that condition. 
Id. at 731-32. According to the Court, a provision in a lease agreement requiring the 
lessor "to keep the roof of the leased premises in good condition and repair" created a 
"duty of the lessor to see that a roof in good condition and repair was available . . . at 
all times . . . ." Id. at 732. 
The rule stated by the Court in Wolfe is the same as that adopted by Dayton-
Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 751 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1984), in which the 
court held that if a party has agreed to "repair and maintain in good order and condition" 
a roof, and if the roof "could not be maintained in good order and condition by repairs 
other than by replacement of the roof," 751 F.2d at 220, then the party obligated to 
"repair and maintain in good order and condition" must replace the roof. Id. 
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In Yakima Valley Motors v. Webb Tractor & Equipment Co., 128 P. 507 (Wash. 
1942), the lessee had promised in a lease agreement to "make such repairs to both the 
exterior and interior of [the leased] building, including the roof thereof, . . . in as good 
condition as the same now is, and in as good condition as the same may be placed and 
after the completion of said changes, alterations and repairs to be made thereto by the 
lessee as herein contemplated." Because the roof was "in such bad state that it could not 
have been repaired at a cost less than that of a new roof," 128 P. at 509, the court ruled 
the lessee was responsible for the replacement. The court noted that "[w]here a lessee 
covenants to put and keep a building in repair, he is bound to keep it 'wind and water 
tight.'" Id. at 509 (quoting 32 Am. Jur. § 780); see also Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Oregon 
Ry. & Nav. Co., 37 F. 733, 734 (D. Or. 1885) (holding that where a party covenanted 
in a lease agreement to maintain and operate a road, and keep it in good repair, it was 
obligated to replace two bridges carried away by floods). 
B. The Surrender Clause in the Lease Agreement Does Not Restrict or 
Modify the Obligation of the Griffithses to Assure. By Whatever Means 
Required. That the Roof Will, at All Times, Be in Sound Condition, 
The Griffithses argue that paragraph 4.1 of the Lease Agreement, which requires 
the Griffithses to "maintain and keep in repair (and . . . put in repair where necessary) 
the walls and roof of the building," is somehow modified and restricted by paragraph 4.2, 
which requires the Griffithses to surrender the leased premises "in as good condition as 
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it was at the beginning of the term, reasonable wear excepted." Appellants' Brief, at 26-
32. The Griffithses maintain that their unqualified obligations in paragraph 4.1 to 
maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, and, where necessary, put the roof into repair, 
are oblitera ed by an exception, found in the surrender clause (paragraph 4.2), for 
"reasonable wear."12 
To adopt the reasoning of the Griffithses would entirely eliminate paragraph 4.1 
of the Lease Agreement, in violation of the principle that contracts are to be interpreted 
in a manner that harmonizes all provisions and gives effect to every provision. See, e.g., 
Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992). First, the Griffithses cite to the 
Restatement (Second) of Property for the following proposition: 
A promise by the tenant to keep the leased premises in repair, unless the 
language of the promise clearly provides otherwise, does not obligate the 
tenant to make repairs other than those that are the result of ordinary wear 
and tear on the leased property. 
12Instead of citing to current case law on this issue, the Griffithses are content to rely 
on six extremely outdated cases, the most recent of which is a 1954 decision of the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Appellants' Brief, at 27-28. In fact, two of the cases relied on by the 
Griffithses are so old they do not even bear a date in their citations; two others were 
decided in 1901 and 1917, respectively. 
The reasoning in those cases flies in the face of the current controlling principles 
of contract interpretation. Instead of giving effect to each provision in the contract, the 
cases on which the Griffithses rely give effect only to the surrender clauses in lease 
agreements, rendering meaningless the repair and maintenance clauses. See, e.g., Corbett 
v. Derman Shoe Co., 155 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Mass. 1959), which notes that one of the 
cases upon which the Griffithses rely, Ball v. Wyeth, 8 Allen, Mass. 275, "makes the 
redelivery covenant alone significant." 
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Appellants' Brief, at 20 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property § 13.1 cmt. c (1977) 
(emphasis added)). 
Then, the Griffithses seek to remove even repairs necessitated by ordinary wear 
and tear from the coverage of paragraph 4.1 by arguing that the exception for "reasonable 
wear" in paragraph 4.2 should be engrafted on paragraph 4.1. Hence, if the Griffithses' 
theory of contract construction were accepted, paragraph 4.1 of the Lease Agreement 
would magically disappear, leaving no obligation whatsoever for the Griffithses to 
maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, or put the roof into repair, as they expressly 
agreed to do. As the court in Avelez Hotel Corp. v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 87 So. 2d 63, 
66 (Miss. 1956), noted: "If defendant's theory were to be regarded as correct, why did 
the lease contain this covenant as to necessary repairs at all?"13 
The more recent cases have recognized that an exception for "wear and tear" in 
a surrender clause does not restrict the obligations under an unqualified promise to 
maintain or keep in repair. For instance, in Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Ruben, 493 
13In Avelez, the court considered the effect of a surrender clause on the timing of an 
action for breach of a repairs covenant. The court noted as follows: 
A distinction is made between a covenant to repair and a covenant to 
surrender in repair. The former differs from the latter in that it is more 
extensive in its application. A covenant to make repairs from time to time 
is not satisfied by making repairs at any time before the premises are 
surrendered. Repairs must be made when needed. 
87 So. 2d at 65. 
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S.W.2d 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973), the lease under consideration, similar to the Lease 
Agreement at issue in the instant case, provided, in part, as follows: 
[1] All repairs deemed necessary by Lessee during the term of this 
lease, and the expense of maintaining both the exterior and the 
interior . . . of said demised premises . . . shall be at the cost and 
expense of the Lessee . . . . 
* * * 
[3] The Lessee and all holding under said Lessee agree to . . . keep the same 
in good order and repair, and to surrender the said premises at the 
termination of this lease in as good condition as received, ordinary wear 
and tear and depreciation excepted. 
493 S.W.2dat75. 
In Garland, the tenant sought to modify its broad obligation under the first 
paragraph by imposing the exception in the third paragraph upon it. The court refused 
to disregard the repair clause, as the tenant sought, commenting as follows: 
Garland [tenant] seeks relief from the broad liability of sentence [1] 
by relying on sentence [3]. Therein Garland was obligated to keep the 
building in good order and repair and to surrender it in as good condition 
as when received, ordinary wear and tear and depreciation excepted. There 
is no need to credit Garland's argument that repairing the facing is within 
the last quoted phrase. First, we are not concerned with liability existing 
at surrender time . . . . Second, reading the whole paragraph it is clear 
sentence [3] in no way limits Garland's continuing obligation under sentence 
[1] to maintain the exterior of the building. 
Id. 
Likewise, in another case involving repair and termination clauses similar to those 
in the Lease Agreement entered into between the Griffithses and SLW, the court held 
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"that the covenant to keep the premises in good repair is not subject to and is independent 
of the surrender covenant which excepts ordinary wear and tear." McKinnery v. White 
Sewing Machine Corp., 200 N.E.2d 596, 601 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964). 
Clearly, because each provision of a contract is to be given effect, with none of 
them ignored, Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981), 
paragraph 4.1 of the parties' Lease Agreement must be read as requiring the Griffithses 
to take whatever steps are necessary to keep or put the roof in a sound condition. To 
except from that duty those repairs necessitated by "reasonable wear" would completely 
eviscerate the Griffithses' obligations, rendering paragraph 4.1 virtually of no effect. The 
clear language of paragraph 4.1 must control; the Griffithses have a duty during the term 
of the lease to maintain the roof, and to keep, and put, it in a good, sound, usable 
condition. 
C. To Hold the Griffithses to Their Agreement Would Be Equitable: To 
Allow Them to Avoid Their Obligations Would be Wholly Inequitable, 
Having agreed they would pay to SLW "a fixed guaranteed lease" (R. at 163), and 
having agreed they would maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, and, where 
necessary, put the roof into repair, the Griffithses seek to avoid their unambiguous 
promises by arguing that to hold them to their commitment would be "inequitable." 
Appellants' Brief at 32-37. 
27 
The only inequity that could result here would be for the Griffithses to be allowed 
to dodge their duty to keep and put the roof in sound condition. They sold the building, 
then leased it back. At the time of the lease, the roof, which had a 20-year life 
expectancy, was 13 years old. The Griffithses knew, or certainly should have known, 
that the roof would require replacement approximately 7 years into their 15-year lease. 
If they did not intend to undertake the obligation to keep and put the roof in sound 
condition, they could have tried to negotiate a lease agreement that placed the duty to 
maintain the roof and keep it in repair on SLW. That is not, however, what the Lease 
Agreement provides. It is now too late for the Griffithses to complain that they do not 
think the deal they struck was an "equitable" one. 
In Robinson v. Wilson, 173 P. 331 (Wash. 1918), the tenant argued that the 
landlord should be responsible for certain defects in the leased building, including the 
seeping of water. Noting that the only obligation of the landlord was to construct the 
building according to "plans and specifications," and that the tenant had not proven the 
building was not so constructed, the court addressed the "fairness" question as follows: 
The trouble in this case is that we are asked to make a contract 
grounded in the equities incident to subsequent events, where the parties 
who might have foreseen every incident and circumstances now relied on 
failed to guard against them in their written contract. 
* * * 
It may at times result in inequity, but the law is so written that a 
landlord is not bound beyond the terms of his lease, and that parties who 
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enter written contracts are presumed to have in contemplation probable 
consequence and the established principles of the law. 
Written contracts would be of little consequence in the business 
world if they were to be so overcome, or if, working to the disadvantage 
of one who has agreed to pay a certain price, his express contract could be 
turned, over the protest of his adversary, into a quantum valebat. 
173 P. at 333. 
That principle has been repeated several times by the Utah Supreme Court, as 
follows: 
Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court has any right to 
ignore or modify conditions which are clearly expressed merely because it 
may subject one of the parties to hardship, but they must be enforced "in 
accordance with the intention as * * * manifested by the language used by 
the parties in the contract." 
Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958) (quoting Murphy v. 
Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 295, 236 P. 680, 683 (Utah 1925)); see also Jones v. ACME 
Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d 743, 746 (Utah 1969). 
The uncontroverted record is that the Griffithses initially had ten years use of a 20-
year roof; at the end of the lease term, they will have had five years use of a roof that 
has only a 10-year manufacturer's warranty. Clark Aff., at 3, 1f 10 (R. at 59).14 Also, 
14Carl Clark stated in his affidavit that the roof installed by Clark's Quality Roofing 
has a "rated maximum life expectancy of 20 years" (emphasis added), but that there is 
only "a 10-year manufacturer's warranty on materials and a 5-year warranty on labor." 
Clark Aff., at 3, 1 10 (R. at 59). 
(continued...) 
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the amount paid by the Griffithses is less than one-half the amount of their annual lease 
obligation and less than 3% of the total lease payments to be made during the lease term. 
This case poses a far different situation than the cases relied upon by the Griffithses, Scott 
and Mobil Oil, for their argument that it would be unfair to hold them to their agreement. 
Appellants' Brief at 33-36. Scott and Mobil Oil are wholly inapposite. As noted at pages 
17 through 19, supra, the courts in Scott and Mobil Oil both found that the repairs 
involved in those cases were unforeseeable at the time the lease agreements were entered 
into. Also, in both cases, general covenants of repair were at issue, with no mention of 
the specific areas requiring repairs. Finally, the repairs at issue in both of those cases 
were enormously expensive in relation to the annual lease payments. In Scott, the rental 
amount was $700 per month, 555 P.2d at 573, and the cost of repairs was estimated at 
14(... continued) 
Kraig S. Clawson stated in his affidavit that "the single ply membrane roof . . . 
installed on the [Orange Street Building] has a normal life expectancy of approximately 
10 years." Affidavit of Kraig S. Clawson, at 2, f3 (R. at 87) (emphasis added). 
Those affidavits are not inconsistent, inasmuch as Mr. Clark spoke of a 
"maximum" life expectancy, while Mr. Clawson spoke of a "normal" life expectancy. 
However, even if there were some factual dispute as to the life expectancy of the roof 
installed by Clark's Quality Roofing, it is not a material issue inasmuch as (1) any 
difference in life expectancy of the roof would not affect the analysis of the "equities"; 
and (2) regardless of the life expectancy of the roof, the new roof was required in order 
for the Griffithses to comply with their duty to maintain the roof, and to keep it, and put 
it into, sound condition. 
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$60,000, id. at 575; in Mobil Oil, the rental amount was $350,000 per year and the total 
cost of repairs was $438,207.66. 689 S.W.2d at 659. 
The agreement of the Griffithses with respect to the maintenance and condition of 
the roof was entirely fair and unambiguously stated in the Lease Agreement. The 
agreement of the parties having been negotiated and reduced to writing, it would be 
entirely inequitable for this Court to rewrite the contract and permit the Griffithses to 
avoid their duty. 
III. SLW HAS NO DUTY, AT COMMON LAW OR UNDER THE TERMS OF 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT. TO REPAIR OR REPLACE THE ROOF 
DURING THE GRIFFITHSES' TENANCY, 
The Griffithses argue that they do not have a duty to keep or put the roof in sound 
condition, notwithstanding their unambiguous agreement to do so. But nowhere do the 
Griffithses argue that SLW has any such duty.15 The absence of such an agreement is for 
15The Griffithses, understandably, appear to have abandoned their argument that 
paragraph 17.5 of the Lease Agreement imposes some sort of duty on SLW to make 
"replacements." See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, at 7 (R. at 36). Paragraph 17.5 provides for the abatement of rent 
in the event the leased premises are rendered unfit for more than ten days by the making 
of repairs, replacements or additions without the Griffithses' consent and not caused by 
the misuse or neglect of the Griffithses. Lease Agreement, at 8, if 17.5 (R. at 55). Such 
a provision, which contemplates the possibility of repairs, replacements or additions, 
however, does not translate into a legal duty to repair, replace or add anything to the 
leased premises. See, e.g., Cherberg v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 549 P.2d 46, 51 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976) ("[LJessor has expressly reserved the right to repair the portions 
of the building not forming a part of the demised premises. Such a reserved right is far 
removed from an express undertaking to perform repair."). 
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for good reason; nothing in the common law, nor in the Lease Agreement, imposes upon 
SLW any duty whatsoever to repair or replace the roof. 
The agreement of the parties was that the Griffithses would pay to SLW "a fixed 
guaranteed lease." Purchase Agreement, at 16 (R. at 163). SLW did not undertake, in 
the Lease Agreement or elsewhere, to repair, replace, or renovate anything. 
Inasmuch as SLW did not undertake to make any repairs, replacements or 
renovations in the Lease Agreement, they have no such duty because, absent an 
agreement, a lessor has no duty to repair, replace or renovate anything. The common 
law rule was described by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
[Ajbsent deceit or fraud on the part of the landlord or an express warranty 
to the contrary, the landlord [has] no duty to make repairs during the course 
of the tenancy. 
Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah 1991) (citing Jespersen v. Deseret News 
Publishing Co., 119 Utah 235, 225 P.2d 1050, 1053 (1951)).16 
l6See also Vie Caldor Corp. v. Newburgh Mall Ltd. Partnership, 204 BR. 855, 858 
(Bankr\ S.D.N.Y. 1997) ('f[I]n the absence of a covenant to the contrary, the lessor is 
under no obligation to repair the demised premises."); Egan v. Brewer, 9 Haw. 18, 21 
(1893) ('\A landlord is under no obligation to make repairs, unless such a stipulation 
makes a part of the original contract.'" (quoting Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477)); 
Daley v. Towne, 149 N.W 368, 369 (Minn. 1914) ("It is well stated that in the absence 
of any covenant or agreement in the lease to repair, and where there is no fraud, 
misrepresentation, or concealment by the lessor, there is no implied warranty on his part 
that the leased premises are fit for the purposes for which they are rented, or covenant 
to put them in repair or to keep them so."); Schmidt v. Constans, 85 N.W. 173 (Minn. 
1901); Miller v. Miller, 64 So. 2d 739, 743 (Miss. 1953) ("[I]t is well settled that the 
(continued...) 
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That common law rule is not altered even if a lessee may have no duty to repair 
or replace. For instance, in Western Motors Servicing Corp. v. LandDev. & Inv. Co., 
313 P.2d 927, 929 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), the court held that the absence of a duty on the 
part of the tenant to replace "does not mean that the landlord is under a duty to replace." 
313 P.2d at 929; see also City of St. Petersburg v. Competition Sails, Inc., 449 So. 2d 
852 (Fla. 1984) (holding that a lessor's duty to repair cannot be assumed simply because 
the lessee is not obligated to make repairs). A corollary to that rule is the principle that 
"in the absence of an agreement between the parties, there is no obligation on the part of 
the lessor to pay the lessee for improvements erected by the lessee upon the demised 
premises, even though the improvements are such that by reason of their annexation to 
16(... continued) 
landlord is under no obligation to rebuild or restore premises destroyed without his fault 
if he had not covenanted to do so."); Refrigeration for Science, Inc. v. Deacon Realty 
Corp., 334 N.Y.S.2d 418, 425 (1972) ("Without an express undertaking to repair the 
demised premises, the lessor is neither bound to do so himself nor to pay for repairs 
made by the tenant."); Edwards v. Ollen Restaurant Corp., 98 N. Y.S.2d 815 (1950) ("In 
the absence of a covenant to the contrary, the lessor is under no obligation to repair the 
demised premises . . . . Nor will covenants to repair be implied."); Evco Corp. v. Ross, 
528 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tenn. 1975) ("[Ojrdinarily, as between the landlord and tenant, the 
lessor has no obligation to make repairs upon leased premises. His obligation to do so, 
in general, rests upon contract."); Seone v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 457 S.E.2d 93, 96 
(Va. 1995) ("In the absence of an express agreement, the landlord had no common-law 
or statutory duty to maintain, repair, or replace either the roof or the heating and air 
conditioning units."); Friedman on Leases § 10.101 (1997) ("The landlord is under no 
obligation either to put them [leased premises] in repair or to keep them in repair during 
the term of the lease."). 
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the freehold they may have become a part of the realty and cannot be removed by the 
lessee." Miller, 64 So. 2d at 743 (citing 32 Am. Jur. § 659). 
CONCLUSION 
The determination of the trial court was correct and its ruling should be affirmed. 
*LW has no duty, under either the Lease Agreement or the common law, to repair or 
replace the roof of the premises leased by the Griffithses. And, to paraphrase the Utah 
Supreme Court in Wolfe v. White: The roof was out of good condition and repair. Who 
was to put it in? Clearly, the Griffithses were to "put it in" because they covenanted in 
the Lease Agreement to maintain the roof, to keep it in repair, and, where necessary, to 
put it into repair. 
DATED this /nf day of March, 1998. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
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